Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other writings, of the Wissenschaftslehre — Review of the Journal for truth — Note to “Fichte and Kant”. Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other writings, / J.G. Fichte ; edited and translated, with an introduction and notes, by Daniel Breazeale. Original title: Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre () The present introduction was written by Fichte in , three years after the.
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The Science of Knowing: The foundational portion of the Wissenschaftslehre thus also includes a deduction of the categorical imperative albeit in a particularly abstract and morally empty form and of the practical power of the I. The dogmatist is in danger of losing his Self when his system is attacked; and yet he is not armed against this attack, because there is something within him which takes part with the aggressor; hence, he defends himself with bitterness and heat.
The series is and remains a simple one; and you have not at all explained what was to be explained. Cambridge University Press, True, the former system has the advantage, as we have already said, of being enabled to point out its explanatory ground of all experience—the free acting intelligence—as a fact of consciousness. If persons of this mode of thinking see but a few links of the chain and the rule, according to which conclusions are drawn, they at once fill up the remaining part through their imagination, never investigating further of what they may consist.
Attempt at a Critique of All Revelationtrans.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
For some of them appear altogether dependent upon our freedom, and we cannot possibly believe that there is without us anything corresponding to them. Finally a system of this character puts forth only those laws, according to which the objects of external experience are determined.
Ein deutscher IntroructionsMunich, C. To make the Unthinkable thinkable, Dogmatism has, indeed, attempted to presuppose Thing or the Soul, or both, in such a manner, that the effect of the Thing was to produce a representation. During the Jena period Fichte also developed a system of natural right and ethics, providing for strong redistributive rights and responsibilities on the part of the state, with a view to insuring civil and economic equality of all citizens.
Schulze, Fichte propounded a radically revised version of the Critical philosophy. Fichte Jacobi Jena Kant Kant’s Kantian laws Leibniz Letters manner means merely noumenon nova methodo object opponents original person Peter Baumanns philoso Philosophisches Journal philosophy posited possess possible precisely present presupposes principle proof published Pure Reason question Reinhold representation schaftslehre Schelling Schelling’s sciousness Richte Introduction self-consciousness sense sensible simply sort standpoint Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt supposed sure term theory thing thought tion tism trans transcendental idealism translation understand University of Jena whatsoever wish Wissen words writings.
Faith in the things, for their own sake; hence, mediated Faith in their own desultory self, as simply the result wissendchaftslehre the Things. Idealism, as we have said above, explains the determinations of consciousness from the activity of the Intelligence, which, in its view, is only active and absolute, not passive; since it is postulated as the first and highest, preceded by nothing, which might explain its passivity.
Thus the problematic unity of theoretical and practical reason is guaranteed from the start, inasmuch as this very unity is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness.
I think this or that object! Johann Gottlieb Fichte – – New York: But these constitute by far the smallest portion of the laws of the Intelligence. Hence, even Critical Idealism can proceed in a twofold manner. Science Logic and Mathematics. Account Options Sign in. For I do not want to trouble him yet with the question, how he knows that they are mere immanent laws of the Intelligence.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Aus einem Privatschreiben Having established the foundation of his new system, Fichte then turned to the task of constructing upon this foundation a fully-articulated transcendental system, the overall structure of which is most clearly outlined in the concluding section of the transcripts of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. For consciousness contains not only necessity of Representations, but also freedom thereof; and this freedom again may proceed according to rules.
If somebody should wish to remind us that the conception of a ground must be differently explained, we can, to be sure, not prevent him from forming another conception of it, if he so chooses; but we declare, on the strength of our good right, that we, in the above description of Philosophy, wish tl have nothing else understood by that word. If anybody desired to deny this, he would have to prove that there introductinos still another way to go beyond experience than the one by means of abstraction, or that the consciousness of experience contains more than the two components just mentioned.
As was his custom, he did this first in his private lectures and then in published texts based upon the same. This is a wissenschaftzlehre to the freedom of the thought process, which allows constraint to be viewed and moves the I into the realm of the consciousness.
Hence, this Science expects few proselytes from men who have already formed their character; if our Philosophy has any hopes at all, it entertains them rather from the young generation, the natural vigor of which has not yet been submerged in the weak-mindedness of the age. But that this necessary manner is the fundamental law of all reason, that from it the whole system of our necessary representations, not only of a world and the determinedness and relations of objects, but also of ourselves, as free and practical beings acting under laws can be deduced.
What can possibly ro persons who comprehend this—and to comprehend it is so very easy a matter—to prefer the one over the other; and why skepticism, as the total renunciation of an answer to this problem, does not become universal?
Until you cause the whole Wissneschaftslehre to arise before the eyes of the thinker, you have introdctions pursued Dogmatism into its last hiding places.
Even as he was engaged in this immense theoretical labor, he also tried to address tye larger, popular audience and also threw himself into various practical efforts to reform university life. If the presupposition of Idealism is correct, and if no errors have introdctions made in the deduction, the last result, as containing all the conditions of the first act, must contain the system of all necessary representations, or the total experience;—a comparison, however, which is not instituted in Philosophy itself, but only after that science has finished its work.
If he abstracts from the first, he retains an intelligence in itselfi.
Only one can be the first, ficht beginning the independent; the second by the very fact of being the second, becomes necessarily dependent upon the first, with which it is to be connected—now which of the two is to be made the first? Such a person would either deny his own knowledge, or be altogether differently constructed from other men; in which latter case his denial would be of no concern to us. The second extension was into the realm of moral philosophy, which resulted in the publication of the System of Ethics in accordance with the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre Hence Dogmatism can only repeat its principle, and repeat it in different forms; can only assert and re-assert the same thing; but it can not proceed from what it asserts to what is to be explained, nor ever deduce the one from the other.
For in supposing them to be dependent upon our freedom, all application of the conception of a ground is rejected; they are thus, because I so fashioned them, and if I had fashioned them differently, they would be otherwise. Its peculiar ground is between these two.
Personal conflicts once again led to his resignation, but he retained the prestigious chair of philosophy until his death. Despite this important stricture on the scope of transcendental philosophy, there remains much that can be demonstrated within the foundational portion of the Wissenschaftslehre. For Idealism has not kept this experience in sight, as the preknown object and result, which it should arrive at; in its course of proceeding it knows nothing at all of experience, and does not look upon it: The philosopher stands necessarily under the same conditions, and hence it seems impossible that he can elevate himself beyond experience.
In other languages Add links. Born into a poor family wissenschaftslehge Rammenau, Germany, Johann Gottlieb Fichte attracted the attention of a baron who had him educated at Introductioons and then at the Universities of Jena, Wittenberg, and Leipzig with a view tje a clerical career. Crowe – – Inquiry: My writings are neither to explain Kant, nor to be explained by his; they must stand by themselves, and Kant must not be counted in the game at all.
For instance, the law of Causality is not a first original law, but only one of the many modes of combining the manifold, and to be deduced from the fundamental law of this combination; this law of combining the manifold is again, like the manifold itself, to be deduced from higher laws.
To the extent that any proposed first principle of philosophy is supposed to be the first principle of all knowledge and hence of all argument, it clearly cannot be derived from wissenscahftslehre higher principle and hence cannot be established by any sort of reasoning.
A certain number is given to you. Systematic Overview of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre 4.